And the Humans Save the Day or Maybe They Ruin It: The Importance of Humans in the Loop by Bigler, Mark et al.
And the Humans Saves the Day or Maybe They Ruin It,  
The Importance of Humans in the Loop 
 
Diana DeMott, Roger Boyer, and Mark Bigler 
 
Flying a mission in space requires a massive commitment of resources, and without the talent and 
commitment of the people involved in this effort we would never leave the atmosphere of Earth.  When 
we use the phrase “humans in the loop”, it could apply to almost any endeavor since everything starts 
with humans developing a concept, completing the design process, building or implementing a product 
and using the product to achieve a goal or purpose.  Narrowing the focus to spaceflights, there are a 
variety of individuals involved throughout the preparations for flight and the flight itself.  All of the 
humans involved add value and support for program success. 
The purpose of this paper focuses on how a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) accounts for the human 
in the loop for potential missions using a technique called Human Reliability Analysis (HRA).  Human 
actions can increase or decrease the overall risk via initiating events or mitigating them, thus Removing 
the human from the loop doesn’t always lowers the risk. 
PRA and HRA were introduced into the NASA culture after the Shuttle had been flying for a number of 
years and experienced a major accident.   
HRA captures the risk associated with interactions between humans and equipment, and predicts the 
impact of these interactions on the probability of overall mission failure.  NASA personnel are highly 
trained and qualified, however, even the most highly qualified and trained individuals are susceptible to 
making errors that could impact the mission or crew.  Therefore, human reliability is included in PRA 
models.  Human Error Events represent the potential for humans to make a mistake given the variables 
inherent in a situation.  The Human Error Assessment is an evaluation of how an individual could act 
given the parameters of a defined failure scenario.  It is not intended to place blame. 
Discussions will include how PRA addresses human risk contributions in the following areas: 
 Scope of human actions assessed 
 Identifying human actions important to mission success and failure 
 Human causing failure versus human as backup to mitigate failures 
 Inherent risks involved with using humans in the loop 
 Inherent risk of not using humans in the loop 
 So-called automated systems and early flight testing 
When viewing all human errors as a single risk driver, questions arises concerning the value of humans 
operating as part of the system.  Removing the human from the equation and changing these potential 
human error failure scenarios into automated actions could have the following consequences:  1) when 
using software settings to determine when to abort there are questions regarding what to use as trigger 
points and how to avoid an unnecessary Loss of Mission (LOM),  2) automating activation of abort 
functions based on specific parameters defined with limited information may be based on conservative 
assumptions and create an unnecessary LOM, 3) some potential vehicle separation issues may need 
crew intervention , 4) even with software controlled unmanned missions humans are involved with 
developing software codes, and uploading code to the spacecraft and 5) automated systems cannot 
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address potential situations that have not been identified but could escalate into failure events.  Relying 
on software for expected or routine events may improve the reliability as long as all functions are 
identified and operate as expected.  However, space flights are rarely routine and unexpected situations 
and unanticipated failures that affect software performance may occur and cause a LOM or Loss of Crew 
(LOC).  This option would eliminate the opportunity for crew members to positively affect the event 
outcome. 
Efforts that have been used to reduce risk associated with crew and ground support personnel actions 
include: 
 Using a PRA to understand how and what contributes or encourages humans to make a mistake 
under expected conditions 
 NASA trains crew, console controllers and support personnel to solve problems and react to 
failure scenarios 
 NASA uses pre-planning and risk assessment to reduce risks 
 NASA organizational support and monitoring is available continuously, with experts on call    
 Factors that affect crew performance are identified, including how these conditions may change 
during different mission phases 
 Human Factors and Operations are involved in all matters that affect the crew (such as cabin 
design, operational processes, procedures and flight rules) and provide support during the 
mission 
 Crew and ground support personnel train for years prior to a mission 
 Previous NASA experience and lessons learned are implemented in current programs to improve 
performance 
The results of these actions are intended to reduce overall risk.  Current program efforts in the design 
phase provides insights regarding risks contributors for given parameters, allowing a better 
understanding of overall risk concerns and allow for trade studies as needed.  One of the benefits also 
allows the use of sensitivity analyses.  Sensitivity analysis is a useful tool used to determine the impact 
of how changes to the assumptions or variables will differ from the previous or baseline study.  By 
modifying or changing specific variables in the initial scenario, the analyst, operators, and engineers can 
gain insight into how changes impact the results.  Studies can be run on such diverse subjects as 
determining the importance of a specific component to identifying the impact of changing a basic 
assumption used a part of the PRA’s failure logic model. 
A recent HRA sensitivity study for the new ORION vehicle provided insight into how crew actions 
associated with mitigation of LOC scenarios would affect the overall risk by comparing the risk 
associated with the crew’s capability to initiate a manual abort and how risk changed with the removal 
of that capability.   The result showed that ~33 % of overall risk was reduced when the crew could 
perform manual aborts versus having the crew as passengers only.  During the Shuttle program, a similar 
sensitivity assessment was performed which assumed that neither the crew nor the mission control 
center could take action in response to failures causing a Loss of Crew and/or Vehicle (LOC/V).  The 
difference in the risk when the crew and mission control actively responded to failures showed a risk 
reduction of ~91%.  
 
The result of the sensitivity study demonstrates the value of having a highly trained, competent and 
flexible human backup system for expected and unexpected failures.  While HRA assumes that humans 
will fail a percentage of the time, these studies show what would occur if a crew was not available to 
make the attempt as well. 
